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Mr. Brzezinski recently described the human rights' move-
ment of today as an "historical inevitability." He also said that
it represented a "turning point" in human history. Whether the
present stage in its troubled history proves to be a "turning
point" or not will be really for future historians to determine.
But, what is undeniable is that the history of human civiliza-
tion itself largely revolves round the efforts of the enlightened
and well-intentioned in every age to advance the frontiers of
freedom so as to secure the realization of human rights by as
large a number of human beings as possible.
With every technological revolution, with increasingly
greater success of the human species in harnessing the powers
of nature to serve its designs and purposes, the prospects of a
new golden age of material prosperity and contentment repeat-
edly open up before it only to be marred by some new cata-
strophes and dangers disclosed by its inability to control those
who rule and determine the course of history. Racial, religious,
national prides, greed, unwholesome fears and suspicions, lust
of individuals for power and the desire of man to exploit man
to serve short-sighted selfish ends, instead of using newly ac-
quired means and powers for achieving the general good or
welfare of all, have dashed our repeatedly raised hopes to the
ground, and, ultimately, brought down and damaged not only
those few and powerful who have misused their powers but also
the many who are innocent and helpless.
We no longer, or, at least, should no longer hug the delu-
sion that freedom, peace, prosperity, and progress will auto-
matically spread and confer the benefits of modern science on
all mechanically, as it was once believed. These require un-
remitting efforts of honest, competent, and incorruptible gov-
ernments wedded to policies beneficial to the whole of human-
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ity and not to those aimed at promoting the interests of sec-
tions of it only. It also needs the eternal vigilance of watchful
citizens to achieve well-formulated ends by correct means that
do not, by attempting to reach desired goals by taking attrac-
tive but questionable short cuts, twist and defeat the ends
themselves.
THE Two BASES OF HUMAN RIGHTS
I believe in the essential goodness of human nature. I think
that the overwhelming mass of people throughout the world
like to see not only themselves but also others happy and pros-
perous. One does not deserve the high status of a human being
unless one has got the urge deep down within one to say to
every other human being on earth: "I cannot be happy unless
I see you happy too! My well-being and prosperity are galling
to me if I cannot see even your bare needs satisfied! " That, I
believe, is what is meant by human "fraternity." It is the recog-
nition of one's own self in others. And, this is perhaps the best
part of one's true self. It is the core of the "Real Will" of the
Idealist political philosophy. The religious may call it the
"Divinity within us." T. H. Green pointed out, in his lectures
on "Principles of Political Obligation," that Rousseau's theory
of a popular sovereignty rested on the recognition that
there's on earth a yet auguster thing,
Veiled though it be, than Parliament and King!
That "auguster thing" resides, I believe, in the human spirit
or soul (if you like to call it that). If one has faith in it and its
ultimate triumph, one can share not only the belief of Mr.
Brzezinski that the human rights' movement represents what
is historically inevitable in our world, but that, despite the
setbacks or defeats it may suffer temporarily in various parts
of the world, it will eventually establish the just and free worlds
we long for not only in certain fortunate parts of it but through-
out it wherever the human race is found.
However, it is not merely on the ethics of a Law of Nature
or on what one conceives of as the real nature of Man which
does not find fulfillment if any part of the human race suffers
due to the injustice of man to man, but on the elementary
needs of the very survival of the human race, in the economi-
cally, socially, politically, and ideologically interlinked world
of modern science and technology (dislocations caused by eco-
nomic, social, and political suffering and strife leap across na-
tional frontiers), that a sound structure of human rights, pro-
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tected by law and supported by an effective system of public
education, spread all round the globe, must rest. The need for
such a legal-cum-moral structure with institutional instru-
ments for sound formulations and effective enforcement and
realization was literally burnt into our souls and imprinted
upon our minds due to the grossly inhuman abuse of modern
science and technology by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in
attempts to subjugate the rest of the world to satisfy perverted
desires. Hence, human rights, hitherto protected by constitu-
tions of national states only, were made the pivot of the system
of international peace, security, and cooperation embodied in
the United Nations' Charter.
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
The declared international purposes and their implied fol-
lowup actions were elaborated in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, of 1948, the two International Covenants of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Civil and Political
Rights, and in a host of Conventions on special topics, such as
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, and Political Rights of
Women. The European and American Conventions set up re-
gional machinery of what are notable attempts at international
prevention of discrimination and other violations of human
rights. This machinery affords some redress to the injured, on
an international level, for infringements of human rights even
by states of which they are subjects. Recognition of the status
of individuals and groups in international law, so as to enable
them to invoke a "law" relating to human rights against of-
fending states, marks a shift in the very basis of international
law. It is now not only a law recognized by nation states for the
purpose of regulating their own relations, but also one for pro-
tecting individuals against maltreatment and injustice by gov-
ernments of their own countries. It is on its way to becoming
part of the universally recognized law of whole mankind. De-
spite shortcomings and failures of this "law" in the field of
enforcement, I agree with Professor Louis B. Sohn's broadly
stated assessment, reached after a survey of international in-
struments and practices: "[T]he Universal Declaration of
Human Rights has thus become a part of the constitutional law
of the world community; and, together with the Charter of the
United Nations, it has achieved the character of a world law
19801
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superior to all other international instruments and to domestic
laws."'
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted,
without a dissent (although some countries abstained from vot-
ing), as long ago as 1948, by all the countries represented in the
United Nations organization, was meant to provide "a common
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations," so
that "every individual and every organ of society, keeping this
Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and
education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and
by progressive measures, national and international, to secure
their universal and effective recognition and observance."
Nevertheless, the divergent expositions of its meaning and sig-
nificance by jurists and the varying attitudes of both govern-
ments and peoples of different countries around the world on
human rights issues remind one of an amusing story of how
writers of different nationalities, each setting out to write a
book on "The Elephant," revealed their particular approaches
to the same subject.
THE STATE: A MAD ELEPHANT?
The story runs: The Frenchman paid a few casual visits to
the zoo, and, in a fortnight, produced a booklet, in yellow and
blue colors on "Les amours des elephantes! " The Englishman
marched off to Africa, and, in three months, wrote a book on
"How I captured my first elephant!" The American started
collecting statistics on elephants, and, after he had collected
enough, published a guidebook on "Bigger and Better Ele-
phants! " The German explored every conceivable source of
information on elephants, and, after three years, brought out
three volumes, each running into a thousand pages, and called
his work: "An Introduction to the Study of the Elephant! "The
Russian, it is said, wrote a much less comprehensive thesis, in
less time, about the "Beneficial effects of Communism on Ele-
phants!" The Irishman, however, promptly issued, within a
few days, a virulent political pamphlet entitled: "The Ele-
phant and the Irish Question! "
If I were asked to write about the Elephant, in my present
state of mind, I would follow the Irishman and write quite a lot
about "The Elephant and Human Rights." And, I would iden-




tify that elephant as "the State," whose duty it is to protect,promote, and enforce human rights, but which, very paradoxi-
cally and tragically, is often seen acting like an elephant gone
mad, particularly in Asia and Africa now. My observationshere will be directed mainly towards considering conditions
needed for taming that elephant. In some countries, such asIndia, the primary human rights problems are those involvedin providing food to the starving, shelter to the homeless,
clothing to the naked, health to the deceased, jobs to the unem-ployed, widespread vocational education as means of making
a respectable living, and scientific knowledge and education to
remove superstitions and prejudices which prevent the growth
and expansion of human minds and spirits. It is only after these
elementary needs of our masses are adequately met that they
could conceive of those "bigger and better" sophisticated and
refined human rights about which so many people in the Westfeel so concerned. I may be forgiven for observing that the
manner in which human rights problems tend to be discussedin Western countries not infrequently gives the impression thathuman rights could be some pain relieving pills or some attrac-
tive goods manufactured in the West which could be exported
and profitably sold to Asiatics and Africans. To us, they are
matters of utmost urgency, raising questions of life and death,involving fates of millions. Inability to cope with these ques-
tions is toppling governments, causing social, economic, and
political upheavals throughout Asia.
It should be evident to everyone who looks at the rapidly
changing economic, social, and political scenes in Asia that,
unlike the relative stability of the West in these respects, per-haps the greatest danger spots for world peace and security liein Asia. If we are really concerned about human rights, with
which world peace and security are inseparably bound up, ourgreatest efforts would be directed towards providing them in
regions where they are most ruthlessly and systematically
trampled upon and, therefore, most required. They cannot, asI have already said, be just manufactured in the West and
offered for sale to Asiatics and Africans. They have to be not
only fought for and won, but also constantly cherished, nursed,
and guarded by those who need them. Effective means for ob-
taining them and suitable machinery for adequately protecting
them even against infringements of these rights by their ownStates and governments, and for promoting their increasing
realization and expansion, to have real value and the required
19801
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strength and stability, have to be devised indigenously by
those who live in territories subject to these States. All that
others can do is to help, where possible, to create conditions
which may enable those who must help themselves to do so.
SELF-DETERMINATION
The indestructible faith of the American people in human
rights was proclaimed nowhere more pithily, more powerfully,
or more nobly than in the Preamble to their Declaration of
Independence of July 4, 1776, which, as we all know, described
as self-evident truths: "that all men [which, correctly inter-
preted, includes all women too] are created equal; that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights;
that among these are life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness."
What is less well remembered is that here we also find the right
of individuals to change or overthrow governments which fail
to satisfy their true purposes. It went on to say that "to secure
these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed; that when-
ever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends
it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it and to institute
a new government, laying its foundations on such principles
and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall most
likely effect their safety and happiness."
When this principle of self-determination was thus enunci-
ated in the preamble to the American declaration, democracy
appeared to many people as a panacea for all the ills of govern-
ment and a sufficient safeguard against misuses of power by
governments. The twentieth century world, however, has expe-
rienced not only vast technological revolutions but exposed the
grave dangers of misuses of science by exploitative interests
and groups and governments. We saw the ease with which even
a people so cultured and gifted as the German nation could be
reduced to a state of frenzy and become the prisoner of a sys-
tem built up by paranoids, bent on slaughter and destruction,
using scientific techniques based on the theories of Professor
Pavlov in a way which was depicted graphically in Serge Cha-
khotin's book on "The Rape of the Masses."2
2. S. CHAKHOTIN, THE RAPE OF THE MASSES 11-41 (1940).
HUMAN RIGHTS
COMPLEXITIES AND DANGERS
The problems of our world of modern science and economic
and political independence of all its parts have become so baf-
flingly complex that even highly educated individuals of ad-
vanced nations tend to be attracted by simplifying analyses,
which are rarely wholly correct, and, consequently, also by
equally simple suggested solutions which could, if accepted,
raise more problems than solve them. When, added to this
increased complexity of our world, there is economic suffering
and insecurity, it is not surprising that the common man gener-
ally prefers what appears to him to offer an escape from eco-
nomic uncertainty and distress even if it involves loss of politi-
cal freedom or of right of free expression and criticism. And,
when one thinks of the poverty-stricken mentally and spiritu-
ally inhibited average or common man in a country like India,
one wonders how he could be expected to use his political free-
dom at all well before he attains a sufficient measure of eco-
nomic, social, and intellectual freedom and independence.
The situation depicted above is full of grave dangers. It
enables greedy, dishonest, power-seeking, corrupt individuals
and groups, whether they be in politics, government, business,
industry, or the professions, to exploit masses of easily misled
people. In Western countries, such as Britain and the U.S.A.,
there is a sufficiently affluent, enlightened, critical, vigilant
middle class of persons who lead and form public opinion. Al-
though this opinion is not infallible, yet, its pressure prevents
democratic systems of government, built on the secure founda-
tions of healthy traditions of respect for elementary human
rights, from failing or meeting any major disaster. In India too,
an educated middle class, in which the late Pandit Jawaharlal
Nehru had great faith, has provided such stability and strength
to democratic forces and system of government as to keep it
functioning despite an emergency during which enforcement of
a number of basic rights was temporarily suspended for ques-
tionable reasons. This class is drawn from urban-commercial
and rural-landowning circles, the not uninfluential liberal
professions, and salaried persons with comparatively fixed in-
comes. It is a class which perhaps suffers most, at least that
part of it which depends on fixed incomes, under the impact
of world-wide inflation, rise in prices, and economic depression.
It tends to be squeezed out by economic distress and to provide
converts to disturbing revolutionary movements which some-
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times adopt even terroristic methods to express their sense of
frustration.
AN ANTHROPOLOGIST SPEAKS
A distinguished American anthropologist, Professor
Berreman, who seemed to have been principally thinking of
India, which country he mentioned repeatedly in the course of
a recent address advocating a marriage between science and
ethics (although his assessment could be meant to apply to
other Asian countries.too such as Pakistan, Thailand, Indone-
sia, and the Phillipines), opines: "Technological progress has
contributed largely to impairment of human rights in the world
today by providing the wherewithal for dramatically increased
disparities among and within nations in the distribution of
food, health, housing, employment, income, wealth, justice,
security, self-determination, recreation and life expectancy.
With the end of colonialism, the spread of man's communica-
tions and the dissemination of fateful technological capabili-
ties, the means to express resentment and to obtain redress are
becoming irresistible even as efforts to hoard privilege, re-
sources, and power become more determined. As a result the
world is one of diminishing personal safety, individual satisfac-
tion, social stability and collective security. To continue to
ignore or slight human rights in pursuit of technological effi-
ciency in order to maximize returns on investments is to in-
creasingly jeopardize individuals, institutions, and human-
kind. Social justice and survival have finally met on common
ground." In other words, without social justice, not only human
rights in Asia and Africa but also world peace and security will
be jeopardized.
IRAN
Perhaps Professor Berreman's analysis applies most aptly
to Iran, where popular revolt against the frying pan of a dicta-
torial oppression, denial of human rights, and the draining of
the country's wealth by the Shah and a corrupt bureaucracy
has thrown that unfortunate country into the fire of an anarchy
in which religious bigotry and theocratic rule, if not lawless-
ness, disorder, and lynch law, spell the doom of human rights
for the present. And, the overthrow of a regime which, though
it perhaps promoted a superficial progress towards some
secularism, had concentrated primarily on making maximum
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profits, has caused an energy crisis throughout the world
threatening to upset world economy and to impede progress
towards greater prosperity, bigger and better human rights,
and more social justice in all parts of the world.
The solution, which may seem sensible to the absolutely
rational, particularly in view of unjustifiable rises in the price
of essential commodities like oil to make more and more prof-
its, is that the whole of earth's natural resources be treated as
the common heritage of all mankind and their outcome distrib-
uted equitably between whole mankind in accordance with
needs and contributions to production under a justly framed
world plan. But, such drastic solutions are hardly practicable.
They must perhaps await acceptance until mankind has more
than half destroyed itself by another world holocaust far more
destructive than the last one or until the human rights move-
ment becomes strong enough to persuade peoples throughout
the world to accept voluntarily some kind of a world superstate
or confederal authority based on mutual trust, understanding,
and cooperation, which could protect the common interests of
all as against sectional interests of some only out of deep con-
cern for our common humanity and a common need and desire
for survival. Some historians, such as the American Professor
Thompson, seem to think that it is not only more likely but
almost certain that the former and not the latter event will
happen before the end of the twentieth century. I prefer not to
be so pessimistic.
U.S.S.R.
I cannot omit from this bird's-eye view of protection of
human rights in Asia, the position in the U.S.S.R.-the major
part of which is Asian-as I saw it in the course of a short visit
as a member of an official delegation to that country. In their
system, our doctrines of Separation of Powers and of Judicial
Review of Administrative and Legislative action have no place.
But, we were informed that the Procurator-General, with Pro-
curators working under his supervision and guidance in all the
Republics of the U.S.S.R. as guardians of the "Principle of
Legality," looks after allegations of wrongs done or breaches of
duty by officials as well as by citizens in a manner which,
because it is not surrounded with technicalities, provides
speedier and more effective relief than the citizen could get
under our system with its dilatory and ruinously expensive
litigation in courts. Indeed, the proved effectiveness of this
19801
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mode of providing much needed speedy relief to aggrieved citi-
zens, instead of compelling them to litigate, underlies sugges-
tions for adopting the institution of the Ombudsman, or a Pub-
lic Grievances' Commissioner, which is said to have worked
very well in Scandinavian countries and in New Zealand. The
idea is attractive in these days of increased legal delays and
complexities and expensiveness of litigation in courts of the
type we are accustomed.
The Russian system of holding periodic conferences of
Chief Justices of all Republics, who are ex-officio members of
the Supreme Court, and judges of the Supreme Court of the
U.S.S.R., and the Procurator-General, and the Minister for
Law and Justice of the U.S.S.R., to lay down principles of
policy to be followed in the decision of cases before courts was,
I confess, very difficult for me to understand at all well. If the
object was, as it appeared to be, that courts should have a part
to play, through their decisions, in carrying out some periodi-
cally reviewed and discussed Socialistic policies, such a princi-
ple would certainly appear to one brought up on a very differ-
ent constitutional philosophy to strike at the root of judicial
independence as we conceive of it. We are told that courts in
the U.S.S.R. have an important "educational role" to play in
sustaining socialistic social structure, ideology, and outlook.
This feature, combined with the constitutional provision vest-
ing the power of interpreting the Constitution authoritatively
in the Supreme Soviet, which is also the supreme administra-
tive and executive authority, makes it clear that the judicial
role in the U.S.S.R. is, apparently, to cooperate with and not
to control the executive or legislative organs or to protect the
individual against any possible encroachment by them on his
or her human rights. If there had been a Supreme Court in the
U.S.S.R. invested with the power to correct the aberrations of
the Executive in dealing with human rights or to lecture to the
Russian Government in the way in which the Supreme Court
of India frequently lectures to the Government of India, it
could have told the Russian Government that, although the
State had abolished private property in means of production
and nationalized these, it was going too far in asserting a new
species of the State's proprietory rights unjustifiably over wives
of foreign diplomats simply because they happened to have
Russian nationality before they were married, and that it was,




This reminds me of the grossly twisted view of human
rights of women revealed by the shooting down, presumably on
official orders, of an unhappily married woman of the Saudi
Arabian royal family seen in the company of a man other than
her husband. The man, who was not killed, was reported tohave explained that he was only trying to help her obtain some
legal aid against her husband's alleged cruelty. The official
explanation showed that, without considering any trial of any
disputed facts to be necessary, .the woman was assumed to havebeen guilty of infidelity to her husband for which death by
shooting, without any trial, was considered to be suitable pun-
ishment! In the Arab kingdoms and sheikdoms there are no
constitutional provisions, so far as I know, for enforcing any
basic human rights against the government. "Islamic brother-
hood" does not seem to be enough to prevent barbaric disregard
of human dignity and rights.
Before leaving the Near East, which is often spoken of as
the "Middle East" here, I may observe that the real problem
between the Israelis and Arabs seems to me to lie in the
religious-cum 
-cultural exclusiveness or intolerance of each to-
wards the other which not only prevents them from integrating
as members of a single society but also makes them disinclined
to accept even coexistence as equals living side by side al-
though both are Semetics. If each community could, in future,
be somehow persuaded to accept members of the other com-
munity as citizens of equal worth with equal legal rights, knit
together in a single secular federal or confederal democratic
polity, just as we in India, with even greater divergencies in
culture and religion, have managed to build our peculiar quasi-federal system, there will be hope for peace between them.
President Carter deserves to be congratulated for achieving
what seemed to be practically impossible at one time. The
Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel appears to be a begin-
ning of a new understanding and at least a recognition of the
need for equality and coexistence between the Jew and the
Arab without which further progress in the direction of peace
between them was not possible.
BASIC TENET: EQUALITY
The basic tenet of the human rights movement is the
equality of all mankind in the eye of law. Human rights, tolawyers, are not just moral or natural rights. They are those
19801
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rights without which the individual who is denied these rights
could not be considered to be human in the eye of law. And,
rights to be real and not illusory have to be, as we lawyers know
so well, both legally recognized and enforcible against the State
itself which represents the society on whose behalf it functions.
Although, the duty to recognize them and respect them and
promote their observance, as declared in the International Uni-
versal Declaration, is cast upon individuals, groups, societies,
as well as upon the States and Governments they set up, the
test of the place on the scale of "political civilisation," as
Henry Sidgwick puts it, of a State is the degree to which the
individual can get justice or enforcement of his rights against
the State and its organs and officials, if need be, in the Courts
of the State itself.
SOME INDIAN CASES
Judged by the standard indicated above, judgments of the
Supreme Court of India show that the Indian Republic is
among those at the very apex of Sidgwick's scale.
The Preamble to the Indian Constitution states the follow-
ing objectives of what is described as our "Sovereign Socialist
Secular Democratic Republic": "Justice, social economic and
political; Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith, and wor-
ship; Equality of status and opportunity; Fraternity assuring
the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the
Nation."
Soon after the promulgation of our Constitution in 1950,
questions arose out of the case of preventive detention of Gopa-
lan,' a well known Communist leader, about the meaning of
the constitutional guarantee, given by Article 21 to all per-
sons-not merely to Indian citizens-against deprivation of life
or liberty by the State by any means not in "accordance with
procedure established by law." In view of other constitutional
guarantees, such as that of equal protection of laws and also of
equality before the law-again given to all persons-and cer-
tain additional guarantees of freedom of expression, of move-
ment, and of engaging in any business or profession, given only
to Indian citizens, the Supreme Court was asked to rule
whether the validity and reasonableness of the procedure laid
down by statutory law for preventive detention could be chal-
lenged.
3. A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, [19501 1 S.C.R. 88, 124.
[Vol. 20330
HUMAN RIGHTS
Now, the phrase "procedure established by law" was de-
liberately adopted by our Constitution makers in preference to
"due process of law" after considerable discussion and consid-
eration of the provisions of other constitutions, such as the
Japanese Constitution, and advice of constitutional experts
including Justice Frankfurter of the United States Supreme
Court. Furthermore, Article 22 of our Constitution itself laid
down, quite elaborately, the requirements of a reasonable or
due procedure to be satisfied by all laws relating to preventive
detention. Hence, the Court held that further or other tests of
reasonableness or of due process of law could not arise in such
cases. While doing so, some judges expressed the opinion,
which was not absolutely necessary for deciding the case, that
no questions of impact of other guarantees on a law regulating
deprivation of personal liberty could arise. In subsequent cases,
the Supreme Court explained that the rationale of the decision
in Gopalan's case was confined to challenges to the validity of
laws of preventive detention for which specific tests or require-
ments were very elaborately furnished by Article 22 of our Con-
stitution. It held that this did not stand in the way of expand-
ing the penumbras or the peripheries of personal liberty to
include, for instance, claims for passports, which could be gov-
erned by more than one constitutional guarantee. This wider
view of personal liberty was taken, for instance, in Mrs. Ma-
neka Gandhi's case, 4 recently, where judgments of the United
States Supreme Court and also of the King's courts in England
were used as persuasive authorities.
In the well-known Golak Nath case,' the Supreme Court
of India not only took the view that fundamental rights in our
Constitution constituted an enactment of natural law rights
but also held that abrogation of such natural law rights was
meant to be placed by our Constitution makers beyond the
competence of powers of amendment lodged by the Constitu-
tion in either two-thirds majorities of Parliament or these sup-
plemented by the additional assents of a majority of State
legislatures required for amendments of certain basic constitu-
tional provisions. It accepted John Locke's view that certain
basic freedoms were reserved for themselves by "the people" so
that governments could never legitimately deny them.
The above-mentioned view of a bench of eleven judges of
4. Maneka Ghandi v. Union of India, [1978] 65 A.I.R. 597.
5. L.C. Golak Nath v. Punjab, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 762.
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the Indian Supreme Court, by a narrow majority of one,
adopted in a case involving basic constitutional rights con-
cerning property, was subjected to much criticism. It was over-
ruled in 1973, in Bharti's case,' by a larger bench of thirteen
judges of our Supreme Court, again by a narrow majority of
one. The Supreme Court held here that, although basic rights
could be abridged by adopting the ordinary procedure for
amending the Constitution, yet, the constitutional power of
amendment was subject to and could operate only within what
was described as the "basic structure" of the Constitution. To
discover this basic structure, the Court examined the whole
constitutional scheme and the basic purposes, indicated in the
Preamble, which the Constitution was meant to serve. Princi-
ples, such as Supremacy of the Constitution, Secularism, De-
mocracy, Rule of Law, and Separation of Powers, were declared
as necessarily implied by the "basic structure." It considered
these to be essential for preserving the identity or character of
the Constitution. Chief Justice Sikri, in this case, referred to
and practically read into, while purporting only to interpret,
the Constitution, the whole of the International Declaration of
Human Rights as a part of the structure of our Constitution by
implication. Evidently, the Chief Justice considered their in-
corporation in the Constitution as essential for realizing or
carrying out the objectives of our Constitution stated in its
Preamble and elaborated in Part III dealing with basic human
rights and in Part IV containing the basic obligations of the
State called "Directive Principles of State Policy." He did this
without anything like the ninth Amendment of the United
States Constitution that recognizes basic rights not enumer-
ated in the Constitution and has helped the United States
Supreme Court in expanding the scope of right to personal
liberty and in developing the ever-widening sphere of the right
of privacy of the individual. Our Supreme Court has thus gone
even further without such "artificial" aids if I may so describe
them without disrespect.
Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Bharti's case,
even judges who, like me, could not go so far as the majority
on the "basic structure" doctrine as a limitation on the consti-
tutional power of amendment, have accepted and applied the
doctrine-as they were bound to do-whenever they have felt
that the basic structure of the Constitution, where respect for
6. Kesavananda v. State of Kerala, [19731 Supp. S.C.R. 1.
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and promotion and observance of basic human rights form piv-
otal principles, has been threatened.
My view, in Bharti's case, has been sometimes misrepre-
sented as though it meant that the power of amendment in our
Constitution is unlimited. I have, therefore, had to explain, in
subsequent cases, by citations of passages from my judgment
in Bharti's case, that I recognized four limitations on the power
of constitutional amendment as it then stood. Firstly, the
power of amending the Constitution was subject to the require-
ments of the constitutionally prescribed procedure for an
amendment. Secondly, both the procedure as well as the na-
ture of the power for a constitutional amendment show that,
under the power to amend our Constitution, our Parliament
could only legislate and not adjudicate. It could not, for in-
stance, dress up and disguise and pass off what was really a
process of illegal adjudiction as an amendment. Thirdly, an
amendment of the Constitution is a legislative process operat-
ing on the elevated constitutional lawmaking plane and not on
the ordinary lawmaking level so that matters for which our
Constitution has specifically prescribed other lawmaking pro-
cedures were not to be dealt with under it. Fourthly, an amend-
ment did not include or imply an abrogation of the Constitu-
tion as a whole leaving nothing behind or a constitutional vac-
uum. It is true that I held that the power of amendment was
not limited by the theory that certain matters were too basic
or sacred to be touched by the power of constitutional amend-
ment. But, I took this view principally because I think that it
is a natural human right of citizens to change even the basics
of their form of government when they think this to be neces-
sarily in their interest.7 I thought that people's representatives
in Parliament and not the Judiciary were given the power,
under our Constitution, to decide whether this should be done.
The Supreme Court, however, by a narrow majority of one took
the view, in Bharti's case, that there was a basic structure of
the Constitution within which even the power of amending it
must move.
The question of limits on the Parliament's power of
amendment of our Constitution arose in an acute form in Mrs.
Indira Gandhi's election case in 1975.8 Our Parliament had
virtually taken up before itself the election case of Mrs. Indira
7. Id. at 1975-76.
8. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 2299.
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Gandhi, and indulged in what was considered by it to be consti-
tution making but which really consisted of wiping out the
whole statutory machinery, retrospectively, under which an
election petition against the Prime Minister had-been allowed.
It then declared the judgement of the Election Court to be null
and void and directed the Supreme Court of India, where the
Prime Minister's appeal was pending, to decide the case in
accordance with the Parliament's declaration. The Supreme
Court, however, declared this purported constitution making to
be itself null and void because it constituted a violation of the
principle of separation of powers which had been found by the
Court, in Bharti's case, to be a part of the unalterable basic
structure of the Constitution. I felt compelled, in Mrs. Gan-
dhi's case, to bring out, in the course of a lengthy judgment,
the importance of the principle of the Supremacy of the Consti-
tution, which we had chosen, following the example of the
U.S.A., as against the principle of Sovereignty of Parliament
prevailing in England. This means that the courts in India
ultimately decide whether any. action by any organ of the
State, including a purported constitutional amendment, is in
accordance with the basic purposes of the Constitution, and,
therefore, valid. India's experience of democracy, functioning
under her Constitution, confirms what, according to a British
jurist, is a conclusion emerging from a thousand years of Bri-
tish constitutional history that "no liberty is safe without a
Court to protect it."'
CHINA
My knowledge about respect for human rights in China or
about legal means of enforcing them there is very limited. I
can, however, say that when I happened to question members
of a delegation of Chinese jurists who visited India around 1960,
about modes of redress open to a citizen who complained of
some legal wrong done to him by an official or a department of
the State, they seemed to find the very concept of a legal rem-
edy in a court provided for such an eventuality to be quite
strange and they could only say that such grievances could go
before people's legislatures. Constitutional principles of Sepa-
ration of Powers and Judicial Review of actions of the State's
administrative or legislative organs appeared to them to be
9. See generally M. SIEGHART, GOVERNMENT BY DECREE (1950).
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out of keeping with principles of government or of law in a
Communist system. To my way of thinking the concepts under-
lying periodic purges or liquidation of people supposed to be
hostile to an existing government, which take place in Com-
munist China, and the so-called "punitive" expeditions, which
it undertakes against neighboring countries and the unmerited
slaughter and sufferings of many innocent civilians and de-
struction of their properties involved in such actions ordered by
the State, are very odd. They seem to me to disclose nothing
short of a barbaric disregard of the sanctity of human life and
callousness towards human suffering. We are told that Com-
munist China has overcome problems of feeding and clothing
and housing its myriads. One wonders, when one reads the
pronouncements of its leaders, whether they could overcome
soon their own visions of overlordship and hegemonism of
which they accuse others. It is good to think that windows have
opened there now through which they could view new and bet-
ter ways of thinking and living based on due respect for human
rights. I wish that more Chinese students and scholars could
come here to study, or, alternatively, go to India from where
China once received Buddhism.
EMERGENT OUTLOOK
I have not yet mentioned Japan because her democratic
Constitution which, like ours, is a written one and not only
guarantees basic human rights but, like ours, sets up an inde-
pendent Judiciary to protect them, seems to have worked suc-
cessfully without the kind of crises we have had to face in India.
Evidently, this is so because the Japanese, as compared with
other nations, are far more homogenous and disciplined. The
result is that they are, as a nation, among the affluent with
nothing like the difficult problems India and China, with their
vast sizes and their huge populations, have had to face. Never-
theless, one comes across accounts of discriminatory treatment
suffered by groups of the Japanese such as those of Korean
origin. These are the results of lingering prejudices which seem
to operate against minority groups even in the most advanced
countries of the world, particularly on non-governmental lev-
els. To remove these, as also graver problems, the hope of hu-
manity is still pinned to a better general education of all the
peoples of the world so that we can realize the dream of our
poet Rabindraneth Tagore contained in "Geetanjali":
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Where the mind is without fear and the head is held high:
Where knowledge is free:
Where the world has not been broken up into fragments by
narrow domestic walls:
Where words come out from the depth of truth:
Where tireless striving stretches its arms towards perfec-
tion:
Where the clear stream of reason has not lost its way into
the dreary desert sand of dead habit:
Where the mind is led forward by thee into ever widening
thought and action:
Into that heaven of freedom, my Father,
Let my country awake!
I would like to append an explanation to this vision of a
free world and say that these are the thoughts and feelings of
the citizen of a world struggling to be born who also says: "My
country is the whole wide world. My chosen people is the whole
human race. My freedom is the freedom of all mankind from
exploitation solely for the benefit of some."
If the declaration, made and accepted on behalf of all citi-
zens of the modern world, by their representatives in the
United Nations' General Assembly, of universally recognized
Human Rights, followed by a number of international agree-
ments in the form of covenants, declarations, and accords are
to have substance and reality, mankind, as a whole, must rise
above irrational attachments to labels of creed, race, national-
ity, and region. The world of our dreams must have a basic
legal structure in which the traditional international law doc-
trine of national sovereignty has been appropriately modified
to serve the good of whole humanity.
An International Law that is passing into the stage where
it represents a system of universally recognized and enforced
fundamental rights of all human beings necessarily postulates
such municipal or constitutional laws in every State that these
rights can be initially enforced internally within each State
itself. Resort to any international tribunal or authority should
be necessary only in those very exceptional cases where a
State's machinery for administration of justice may be unable,
for extraordinary reasons, to afford relief. For instance, in the
recent case of the former Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan,
there seemed to be such strongly aroused partisan feelings in
Pakistan, that it is difficult to imagine how a fair trial was
possible there. The right to a fair trial by an impartial and
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independent court is a necessary safeguard of rights to life and
liberty of every person.
BATTLING FOR A BETTER WORLD
The West, which has had its fill of bigotry and wars of
religion, has learnt to look upon divergencies of religious beliefs
and practices as matters of individual tastes and upbringing
which do not jeopardize national unity or civilized existence.
But, in several Asian countries, large scale misuses of religion
for antisocial and anti-human purposes, parading under the
false garbs of cultural, religious, and national "revivals" are
taking place. Most of these "revivals" are, if not death-dealing,
at least culture-killing and spirit-corroding movements insti-
gated by sectional interests hostile to human rights. In a world
which can neither be divided into watertight compartments nor
remain static anywhere, to allow pockets of divisive medeival-
ism and barbarism, which threaten human rights, to swell in
any part of the world could appear to be in cynical alliance with
those reactionary forces which provoke and consolidate dis-
turbing revolutionary elements. "Revivalist" and reactionary
trends are, it seems to me, opposed to what may be described
as the "natural law" of the world of modern science governed
by secular ethics whose objective is "the greatest happiness of
the greatest number."
The only course which citizens of the world, whose objec-
tives are human welfare and happiness throughout the world,
could honestly adopt is to speak freely against all actions and
policies, in any part of the world, which damage the common
objectives. I think there is no escape from the position very
comprehensively and ably argued and established by Dr. Lau-
terpacht, in his work on "International Law and Human
Rights," as long ago as 1950,10 confirmed and strengthened by
international practice as well as by subsequent opinions of
practically all reputed international jurists: that issues relating
to human rights are no longer matters of purely domestic con-
cern on which international public opinion must observe si-
lence. When friendly and bona fide but bold and outspoken
criticism of actions of all people and policies of their govern-
ments, as tested on the anvil of the principles found in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and elaborated in the
10. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 27-72 (1950).
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covenants and other international agreements, has displaced
the pursuit of mere "expediency," when force and violence
have been abandoned by nation-states as instruments of dis-
ruptive and dislocating national policies, whether of external
aggression against other states or of terrorization of individuals
or groups within a state, when "balance of power," which re-
mains the governing principle of international relations today,
has given place to collective and cooperative use of all power
to subserve the requirements of "Justice, social, economic, and
political," embodied in a legally enforcible Rule of Law, when
the developed, prosperous, and powerful nations join hands,
irrespective of their political or socio-economic ideological dif-
ferences, in undertakings which could help the still developing,
poor, and weaker nations to march forward and raise their
general levels of life and thought, when "human rights" do not
appear to be merely convenient weapons in a game of "power-
politics" used by rival nations only to denigrate and damage
each other but have become the earnestly and relentlessly
sought after expanding ends of the endeavours of all people and
their governments throughout the world, as they were presum-
ably meant to be, we could confidently assert that we have
turned a new corner in the history of mankind. Such a turn in
human history could appear to be historically inevitable to
those who are really striving for it.
If even Rome was not built in a day, a legal-cum-moral
structure spread all over the world and protecting and promot-
ing human rights everywhere, could not be erected by the wav-
ing of a magic wand. It requires an incessant war waged in all
parts of the world and at all times methodically, dedicatedly,
nonviolently, in a missionary spirit, by means of weapons con-
sisting largely of words and symbols dexterously used so as to
persuade, convince, convert, and inspire those who must sus-
tain the structure-the ordinary men and women all over the
world.
DISPARITY IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORTS
One is struck by a glaring disparity between the West and
the East in the distribution of both the constitutional machi-
nery for the adequate protection and enforcement of human
rights as well as of official and voluntary efforts to educate
citizens about the meaning and importance of human rights.
In the U.S.A., there are not only alert departments of
State keeping themselves well informed about the position in
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America and elsewhere on the human rights front but also a
standing Civil Rights Commission regularly making admirably
impartial and elaborate reports on every conceivable aspect of
human rights, with a view to suggesting ways and means of
reducing or removing practice of all undue discrimination of
every kind from American life. The subject of human rights
engages the attention of Congressional Committees from time
to time. Considerable research and thought is devoted by schol-
ars working with various American institutes and voluntary
organizations meant especially for the study of human rights
throughout the world. In addition, the subject is prescribed for
courses taken by students at American universities.
In Europe also there are several institutes and associa-
tions, such as, for example, the Human Rights' Institute of
Strasbourg, the Nijhoff Institute at the Hague, carrying out
studies and teaching programs on human rights, and voluntary
organizations, such as the Amnesty and the International Com-
mission of Jurists, which undertake investigations of alleged
violations of human rights all over the world.
In striking contrast with what one finds in the West, in
Asian countries there are not only no such international
schemes for the protection of human rights as those embodied
in the American and European conventions, but there is great
paucity of both official and nonofficial voluntary organizations
and efforts for collection of information on, or systematic study
of, problems relating to human rights. In India, the Union Gov-
ernment has set up a Central Minorities' Commission, and, in
Uttar Pradesh, the largest state of the Indian Union, the State
Government has set up its own Minorities' Commission. But,
the functions and scope of powers of the commissions in India
are so ill-defined and uncertain that the effectiveness of their
work, which consists mainly of investigating grievances of indi-
viduals belonging to "minority" groups, depends largely upon
the force of personalities of the commissioners and the respect
this manages to secure for their findings and suggestions. Simi-
lar commissions have been set up in India for "scheduled
castes" and "backward" classes. I am not aware of any compa-
rable official commissions set up in any other Asian country.
And, even in India, we have no non-official or voluntary organi-
zations, quite independently of the State, carrying on the type
of study, research, or education, found in the U.S.A., concen-
trating especially on human rights viewed as legal means of
development and protection of vital human values related to
expanding social concepts of human needs in a technologically
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and ethically advancing world. I am so full of admiration for
this aspect of American life and thought that, if respect for the
human rights and freedoms of its own citizens was the only test
of the greatness of a nation, there could not, I think, be a
greater nation on this earth. It is something from which Asian
nations could learn a lot.
STANDARDS OF LIVING AND EDUCATION AS SAFEGUARDS
Higher standards of living and of public education safe-
guard people against loss of national sanity and sacrifice of
freedoms and values they learn to defend. Thus, in the U.S.A.,
McCarthyism, a term which now stands for wholesale charac-
ter assassination of individuals and nations for ulterior objects
without due regard for truth, was given a short shrift. A move-
ment like Hitlerism, which swept even a great European nation
off its feet, so that it became a great menace to humanity in
the world for a brief but dreadful period in its history, could
have no prospect of success in the U.S.A. On the other hand,
in Asian countries, the antiquity or excellence of some of the
elements of their civilizations has not been able to protect them
against the emergence of a Stalin in the U.S.S.R., a Shah or a
Khomeini and a General Zia in Iran and Pakistan of our times.
In other Asian countries, people have experimented with less
brutal "authoritarian" regimes.
Fascistic or totalitarian movements, whether in the East
or in the West, feed on the misery and bitterness of the masses,
the difficulties and frustrations of the middle classes, and on
the fears and phobias of vested interests. Their leaders invaria-
bly promise economic, social, and cultural freedoms to gain
followers. They have, in the past, also undertaken to satisfy
dreams of national or group grandeur and glory by means
which necessarily involve internal strife and external aggres-
sion. As their real objectives, which they often try to conceal,
are the domination of the mass of the people by a group or class
and involve a sacrifice of general welfare for the aggrandise-
ment of some, such movements and the regimes they produce
can never be permanent. They almost invariably march from
tyranny to greater tyranny down a road to self-destruction
which results from policies which are bound to provoke and
invite opposition throughout the world to exploitative groups
and classes. The way in which power divorced from its true
purpose, which is human good, "corrupts and absolute power
corrupts absolutely,"-to use Lord Acton's famous maxim-is
[Vol. 20
HUMAN RIGHTS
eloquently portrayed in a recent book by Mr. Robert Payne
entitled The Corrupt Society."
There seems no more imperative duty today before those
who could be considered as good custodians of human virtues
and civilization-which means of human rights-as all citizens
of the modern world should be, than to do all they can to
protect humanity, all over the world, against the possibilities
of emergence of "drunken helmsmen" as Mr. Payne calls dicta-
tors inebriated with power. Human dignity and human rights
suffer more damage and destruction from them than from other
agencies. As indicated above, the possibilities of their emerg-
ence are far greater in developing Asian and African countries
than in Western countries possessing effective means of
"taming" use of governmental power, as Bertrand Russell con-
sidered Democracy, as a system of government, with all its
"checks and balances" and guaranteed freedoms, to be."2
Armed with all the might of modern science, "drunken helms-
men," whether in the East or in the West, can plunge the whole
world into such a mad orgy of destruction that nothing may be
left of it beyond a mass of smouldering ruins in which no form
of life could continue, let alone human life, except perhaps in
the depths of the oceans still left unpolluted so that the process
of biological evolution, from a form of life emerging from the
seas, may have to start again to produce a possibly wiser or
more prudent species than that of man today.
How PROPSECTS COULD BRIGHTEN
The prospects of survival for the human species and of
more widespread and expanded human rights could only
brighten if there is undisturbed peace and understanding be-
tween the West, led by the U.S.A., and the East, represented
by the U.S.S.R., the major part of which is Asian. Although the
U.S.S.R. could not be considered to be the "leader" of the East
in the same way in which the U.S.A. could perhaps be called
the "leader" of the West, yet, as we all know, no Eastern coun-
try or power could match the U.S.S.R. in the powers for de-
struction at its disposal. In a world in which reliance seems still
to be placed primarily on a "balance of terror" for preserving
peace, human rights will not be safe so long as this principle is
not displaced by a firmer and deeper recognition of unity of
11. See R. PAYNE, THE CORRUPT SOCIETY (1975).
12. B. RUSSELL, POWER: A NEW SOCIAL ANALYSIS (1938).
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purposes and a cooperative use of the power and resources of
all the nations for promoting human rights all over the world
starting, of course, as human concern and charity should, at
home.
A BASIC FALLACY
A basic fallacy which seems to haunt many people even
today is that there is some inevitable conflict between
"capitalist" and "socialist" sections of humanity, represented
respectively by the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., which must one
day unavoidably erupt into open hostility and nuclear warfare.
I believe that if we were to examine, in a cool and impartial
fashion, the effects of operations of the socio-economic systems
of both the countries, in the light of the broad agreements not
only about their declared ends but also largely about the means
by which they are to be attained, as embodied in the United
Nations' Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the conventions on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
subsequent international agreements or accords right up to the
Helsinki and Belgrade Conferences, the two systems will ap-
pear to be somewhat differing roads to the same destinations.
It is difficult to imagine why collisions should be necessary
between those travelling on different roads if their destinations
are common. Indeed, impartial studies of the operations of
somewhat differing socio-economic and cultural patterns, with
common objectives, may reveal not only some highly interest-
ing similarities but also areas where improvement in each sys-
tem is possible by learning from the experiences of those gov-
erned by the other.
It would take me far afield if I were to consider here, in any
detail, the respective claims made on behalf of each of the two
systems or their merits and demerits or shortcomings. All that
I would like to point out here is that the suspicions and fears
engendered by prejudiced approaches erect quite unnecessary
barriers on the path of progress of mankind towards a better
and happier world in which all the human rights of all the
people in the world could be duly respected and enforced.
These fears and suspicions lead to the piling up of extremely
expensive nuclear arms on each side, to a very wasteful diver-
sion of enormous resources and wealth which could be much
better utilized for constructive purposes and betterment of
standards of living. There should not, at any rate after the
solemnly reached basic agreements and accords, mentioned
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above, be deviations from the directions indicated there. These
solemn declarations should serve as "standards" or as valuable
means of correcting deviations from the directions indicated
therein, and, thereby, to unite and not to divide nations in
common quests even if the somewhat differing paths adopted
by them, due to differing national histories and conditions,
may necessitate differing responses to the same human needs
and aspirations.
A CODE OF ETHICS
To translate our dreams into a living reality of universal
human brotherhood, peace, progress, prosperity, and happi-
ness, every individual and group and nation, whether in the
East, the West, the North, or the South, should act as a guard-
ian of human rights and of worthy human aspirations. Each
generation in every country of the world has to capture afresh
the spirit and understanding of what the status of a human
being means and the obligations it carries with it. Its duties are
not only towards the living but also towards the future genera-
tions yet unborn. It has been noticed by historians and sociolo-
gists that with a rise in standards of living and thinking and
feeling there is, in every country, a corresponding rise in the
desire to maintain these. The concern for and attempts to
maintain these standards checks improvident population ex-
plosions which also seriously threaten stability of governments
as well as due protection of human rights in Asian countries,
most notably in India. There is no reason why what has hap-
pened in the West should not take place in the East if stan-
dards of living and thinking in the East rise in the same way
as they have done in the West. Indeed, we see this happening
before our eyes as matters of personal experience and knowl-
edge of Westernized sections of Asians.
There is also a great and growing threat to the most ele-
mentary human right to live, which includes the right to a
sound health, posed by the growing environmental pollution of
the earth as well as of the seas. In this respect, it is difficult to
say whether the position is more hazardous in the West or in
the East. All these are, however, problems requiring a global
strategy to cope with them and a new kind of global politics
which could evolve and firmly establish what may be called a
"world law" so that the dignity and rights of the human indi-
vidual, wherever he may be living or found in the world, are
duly respected and protected.
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A "world law" affording adequate protection to the human
rights of the living as well as the prospective rights of genera-
tions to come would have to contain a code of duties also of all
individuals and groups, and, above all, of all governments of
states. In so far as these duties embrace some relating to future
prospects, they may have to be classed as a new group of
"rights of the human race." Could they be invoked by living
or existing persons as trustees on behalf of the "human race"?
It will be difficult to make such parts of a code enforceable
through judicial tribunals. They could, however, be protected
by an enlightened public opinion operating on the strength of
all available scientific knowledge and investigations by reliable
nonjudicial bodies or organizations for research and discovery
and dissemination of information. Suitable national legislation
could also protect us from dangers of the future.
Dr. Lauterpacht, in his classic early exposition of a new
international law, built around a proposed Bill of Rights, so
drafted his code, meant principally to bind states, as to impose
specific obligations on states so that it could not be urged that
what was meant to be done was only to declare vaguely some
moral rights of individuals which the states were not strictly
bound to observe or enforce.' 3 But, Dr. Lauterpacht himself
pointed out repeatedly that duties of States in the socio-
economic sphere, which are the necessary concomitants of a
modern "welfare state," were too vague and difficult to be
capable of enforcement through courts. In view of these diffi-
culties, framers of the Indian Constitution divided duties of the
State into two categories: those which were enforceable
through superior courts by individuals upon whom
"fundamental rights" were conferred, and those which, though
"fundamental" in the governance of the country, called
"Directive Principles of State Policy," could not be so enforced.
Possible conflicts between what were laid down as fundamental
rights of individuals and the fundamental obligations of the
State, conceived of as indicative of the rights and powers of the
State acting on behalf of society as a whole, were sought to be
resolved by the doctrine of reasonable restrictions embodied in
the Indian Constitution. These restrictions are of a kind which
courts in America have also had to evolve as a matter of necess-
ity to protect the common interests of all from damage by
individuals attempting to misuse their freedoms. The Indian
13. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 10, at 323.
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Constitution now contains some duties of citizens also.
The reason underlying the ancient Indian concept of law,
as a part of a "Dharma," enjoining duties of all, particularly
of the King towards his subjects, resulting in a corresponding
set of "rights" even against the Ruler, was thus explained by
Dr. Priyanath Sen, in the introduction of his Tagore Law Lec-
tures on "Hindu Jurisprudence":
The province of law is the establishment of rules for
the regulation of human conduct amidst the diversity of
inclinations and desires, so as to reconcile and harmonize
the wishes of the individual with the interest of the com-
munity in which ultimately the interest of the individual
is also involved; it curtails the fictitious freedom of unregu-
lated desires by subordinating the particular nature of in-
dividual men to the discipline of the community acting
upon universal rational principles, and thereby gradually
tends to bring about the higher freedom which consists in
the dependence of the individual on the dictates of reason,
which, while governing the community, is also his. It may
be that this conception of the aim of law is not consciously
recognized at the outset, but there can hardly be any doubt
that the various systems of law exhibit, on a careful analy-
sis, so many efforts towards the realization of the end indi-
cated above at different stages of development. In so far as
the conditions of different societies and the stages through
which they have passed are not exactly similar, these sys-
tems of law which they have severally evolved are more or
less dissimilar to one another; yet the unity of human con-
stitution and the universality of human reason concur in
producing an essential similarity in all those systems
which exhibits itself to a scientific observer amidst the
diversity to details.
NEEDED: STUDY OF BASIC PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Although there are courses on human rights in various
American universities and European institutes, it seems to me
that, in view of the vital importance of the subject for the
future of mankind, exclusive concentration there on law relat-
ing to human rights and its defects does not produce balanced
results. Perhaps the shortcomings of the law itself could be
more easily removed if human rights were studied everywhere
in their correct historical and sociological perspectives, with
the help of all the allied disciplines-legal history, anthropol-
ogy, comparative religion, scientific technology, ethics, litera-
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ture, art, psychology, economics, and politics insofar as they
have a bearing on human rights, so as to evolve a broad-based
sound common underlying philosophy of human rights which,
when accepted sufficiently widely, finally produces the re-
quired law comprising the structure or framework of a human
society. What is conceived of philosophically or ideologically as
a necessity does, in the end, fructify in the shape of the needed
law.
Our basic attitudes towards human rights must depend
ultimately on our concepts of ourselves as individuals and of
our relations to other human beings. In this sphere, I believe
that the East, with its richness in religious, philosophical, and
poetic thoughts and feelings, produced by intense experiences
and considerable investigations into the depths of human na-
ture, has its contributions to make. There is, for example, the
grandeur of Bhagavadgita" with its picture of a noble struggle
for right causes with right means as the worthiest of human
aspirations. There is a wealth of Arabic and Persian literature
and poetry on the theme touched by the Persian poet Sadi,
widely read not only in Iran but also in India and Pakistan,
when he said: "Bani nau insan azai yak digor und" (Parts of
the human race are like organs of one body). It follows from
such a premise that any injury inflicted on a part of the body
damages the whole.
One would like to see an institute of human rights in every
Asian country so that gems of experience and wisdom, gathered
from the history, the literature, and the art of the Asian coun-
try concerned itself, added to all the knowledge and thought
contributed by thinkers and scholars of other countries also on
the subject of human rights, could be used to build a sound
philosophical edifice of its own in every Asian country to house
and sustain the internationally formulated and declared
human rights.
A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH
My own philosophical approach on the subject-condi-
tioned by my own educational background-certainly tends to
be Western. But, I am not hopeless of the East. In fact, in the
one world, integrated by many world-wide common trends and
patterns of life, thought, and feeling, divisions between East
14. See MAHABHARATA BHAGAVADGITA (M. Chatterji trans. 1960).
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and West appear to be artificial and unnecessary; and, a world
organized on the foundations of a deep understanding and re-
spect for a common internationally recognized and protected
body of human rights offers our only alternative world over to
chaos and destruction in every country. As an optimist, I be-
lieve that the brighter alternative will, after possible errors, be
ultimately adopted everywhere because it falls on the line of
evolution of human law as the framework of a socio-economic
order which must correspond to human needs and realities of
the day in every country.
Long ago, Aristotle, When he spoke of man as a "political
animal" (by which, he meant that he was an institution build-
ing "social" animal) indicated this line of development which
Alexander Pope in his Essay on Man, put in poetic language
as follows:
God loves from Whole to Parts: but human soul
Must rise from Individual to the Whole.
Self-Love but serves the virtuous mind to wake,
As the small pebble stirs the peaceful lake;
Trhe centre mov'd, a circle straight succeeds,
Another still, and still another spreads;
Friend, parent, neighbour, first it will embrace;
His country next; and next all human race;
Wide and more wide, th' o'erflowings of the mind
rake ev'ry creature in, of ev'ry kind;
Earth smiles around, with boundless bounty blest,
And Heav'n beholds its image in his breast.'"
THE DECIPHERABLE DIRECTION
There is thus an easily decipherable direction of all human
effort and thought from the beginnings of man's social institu-
tions and law from a stage in which human groups lived like
isolated "Cyclopean" hordes, described in Homer's poetry,
with neither legislative bodies nor any semblance of a law be-
yond the wishes of despotic heads of families, to the stage in
which elected bodies decide upon what scientifically applied
secular principles and utilitarian reasoning induce them to be-
lieve their actions are in the best interests of all concerned.
Henry Maine described this development which characterised
progressive societies as "a movement from status to con-
15. Pope, Essay on Man in ALEXANDER POPE'S COLLECTED POEMS 214-15 (B.
Dobrde ed. 1924).
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tract"-from a stage in which the legal position and the rights
of the individual were determined entirely by his "status" or
by his birth in a societal setting and not by his own volition or
efforts, to one in which "contract," which was the result of a
free operation of each individual's will and properly directed
efforts, becomes the source of one's rights and the basis of
social cohesion. 6 An absolutely unimpeded exercise of all indi-
vidual volition has never been and can never be, in a human
society, permitted because that would encourage the unscrupu-
lous and jeopardize the rights of the weak. Births in differing
social settings have perhaps always so far affected, in the
course of human history, not only the performances but also,
at least indirectly, the legal positions of individuals. It may,
therefore, seem to be more correct to visualize the progress of
law, from the point of view of the individual's rights, to be one
in which the individual has moved from a lower to a better or
higher status. Thus, an Indian philosopher pointed out that
each ascent by man on the ladder of civilization of greater
social cohesion and progress, has been marked by a widening
of what he called the "symbiotic circle." Hence, he predicted
that "caste," with all that it implied in India, must necessarily
disappear gradually. And, similar must be the direction of
change in every country with similar or comparable divisions
towards a casteless, classless society.
Whether one accepts what is, in juristic jargon, a "natural
law" theory of human rights, 7 or takes the more critical utili-
tarian view of rights, which become, according to utilitarian
ethics, the means of maximizing human welfare and happiness,
or prefers the more fastidious "incipient phenomenology"" of
Immanuel Kant, with its emphasis on the respect for individ-
ual human personality as the true goal of social evolution. We
cannot mistake the direction of the progress of human laws and
institutions.
CONCLUSION
We have progressed to a stage at which every individual
human being, by virtue of having been born as a human being
16. See generally H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861).
17. See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184-20 (1977); E. COR-
WIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1955).
18. Lackland, Toward Creating a Philosophy of Fundamental Human Rights, 6
COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 473, 474, 498-503 (1974-75).
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anywhere in the world, acquires a "status" or a "persona" not
only in municipal law but also under the modern international
law so that his welfare becomes legally a matter of concern to
the world communities of nations and of citizens. Nations of
the world are represented by their governments. But, as gov-
ernments are often the worst offenders against human rights,
citizens of the world must also build independent voluntary
institutions and organs of world opinion so that violations of
human rights, in any part of the world, do not escape condem-
nation by world opinion, and so that the basic structure of a
firmer world law, enforceable all over the world, protecting
human rights everywhere, may arise to satisfy the imperative
needs of mankind today.
The internationally recognized and declared human rights
are not the "bourgeois" claptrap and pretense-sheep's skin of
wolfish nations used to disguise imperialistic or exploitative
designs-they are, not infrequently, misrepresented to be
amongst the developing nations of the world. They contain the
distilled results of the whole experience of mankind, and of its
struggles for justice, freedom, equality, and fraternity. They
constitute the norms of human conduct and relations common
to all civilized nations, whether governed by what is known as
a "capitalist" or as a "socialist" system-the common ends or
directions of their endeavors. They could, therefore, not be
properly used to divide or sow dissention among nations. They
could be legitimately used only to unite them. When the phi-
losophy or reasons underlying them are correctly taught and
understood widely and deeply enough, the corresponding
much-needed worldwide legal structure will, no doubt, emerge
to adequately support and promote and protect them.
I find that sometimes a conflict is sought to be made out
between the two sets of rights embodied in the two interna-
tional covenants: one on the economic, social, and cultural
rights of which the U.S.S.R. is portrayed as the greatest cham-
pion, and the other on the civil and political rights of which the
U.S.A. is depicted as the staunchest protagonist. If such a con-
flict were really there, it should be obvious that the poorer and
weaker developing nations, with their urgent primary needs of
freedom from economic, social, and cultural degradations,
would prefer the first set and gravitate, quite naturally, to-
wards their greater assumed supporters. But, I do not think
that such a supposed conflict between the two sets of rights
exists. Indeed, without a basic economic security, social inte-
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gration, and intellectual freedom, the capacity to use political
and civil rights wisely may be lacking in the people of a coun-
try. Would-be dictators use promises of economic and social
equality and freedom and of cultural development and glory as
baits to attract followers; and, after they have established their
holds, they generally end up with denials of both sets of rights.
It should, therefore, be evident that the two sets of rights are
essentially complementary. They should be viewed as essential
parts of an integrated whole-each as necessary for the fulfill-
ment of the objects of the other, each as a base for building the
other upon, each as a protection and safeguard of the other set.
So viewed and understood there is no room for any conflict, in
normal times, between the two sets of rights. It is the function
of a satisfactory philosophy of human rights to resolve such
supposed conflicts.
Continuing impartial study and research, wider and wider
spread knowledge and public education on questions relating
to human rights, from a philosophically correct angle, seem to
be conditions precedent for a further ascent of mankind on the
ladder of a progress which must appear to be historically inevi-
table to all those who believe that human destiny is not self-
destruction but survival, self-realization, and self-
improvement which must compel them to build solid and firm
protections against suicide or other tragic possibilities. The role
of nonaligned Asian nations should be to act as bridges of un-
derstanding between the East and West. They can do so best
as honourable partners in building bulwarks of freedom and
not as victims of internal anarchy or strife or of external aggres-
sion. Promotion of respect for and observance of human rights
in Asia, as in the rest of the world, is thus inextricably bound
up with maintenance of world peace; and this, in its turn,
depends on both social and economic justice and political and
intellectual freedom the gates of which can only be opened by
better and more widespread education of all the peoples of the
world on lines designed to secure what whole mankind, I be-
lieve, wants, or, at least, needs badly: a true understanding of
the structure of peace, justice, freedom, and human happiness.
Our future is, I think, ultimately in the hands of our education-
ists.
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